Case Study — Structural Limitation
Japan: when the signal works but the basket doesn't
Japan is the one classified region where RegimeR's backtested example baskets fail. Understanding why is more instructive than any of our success stories.
The result
Over 282 months of backtested data (1998–2021), RegimeR's example baskets applied to the Japanese market produced a CAGR of −0.2%, versus +3.8% for buy-and-hold Japanese equities. The system destroyed value. We do not validate Japan as a trading pool and we do not present it as a success.
We publish this because it reveals something important about what RegimeR is — and what it is not.
Two separate problems
1. The baskets are structurally wrong for Japan
RegimeR's example defensive baskets assume bonds rally during equity stress. In the US, Treasuries gained 20–30% during the GFC as capital fled to safety. In Japan, JGBs yielded 0–1% for 25 years. There was no room to rally. The defensive “switch to bonds” had zero carry and near-zero upside.
Cash yields were negative under NIRP. Holding cash cost money. Gold provided some offset but couldn't compensate for the combined drag of zero-yield bonds and negative-yield cash. In every other validated region, defensive assets generate positive carry that funds the opportunity cost of being out of equities. In Japan, they don't.
2. A missing signal: the yen
Japanese equity returns are tightly coupled to yen weakness. When the yen depreciates, exporters' earnings rise and the Nikkei rallies. When the yen strengthens, the opposite. This FX-equity dynamic is the dominant driver of Japanese equity returns — more so than credit stress or growth momentum.
RegimeR's classifier does not include FX positioning. During Abenomics (2013), the dominant market dynamic was yen weakness driving equity returns — the Nikkei surged +26% on currency depreciation. This is a currency-driven pattern the macro classifier does not capture as a distinct regime. The classification reflected mixed macro conditions, which was accurate, but missed the dominant driver of Japanese equity performance in that period.
What the signal did detect
During genuine crises, the regime classification was directionally correct:
| Episode | Nikkei | Example basket | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| GFC (2007–2009) | −47.4% | −18.6% | +28.8pp |
| COVID (2020) | −4.1% | +3.6% | +7.7pp |
| Abenomics (2013) | +26.0% | −1.3% | −27.3pp |
The GFC and COVID results show the signal detecting genuine stress correctly. Even with suboptimal baskets, the backtested defensive allocations preserved 29 and 8 percentage points respectively. The Abenomics result shows the opposite problem: the signal read mixed macro conditions correctly, but the Japanese equity market rallied on currency dynamics the classifier does not capture as a distinct regime.
Why this validates the model
Japan proves that the regime signal and the defensive response are genuinely separate. The signal detected real regime shifts. The example baskets failed because Japan's zero-rate environment eliminates the defensive carry that makes basket switching profitable in other markets.
A Japanese institutional investor receiving “Contraction regime detected” would not switch to JGBs at 0.5% yield. They would deploy Japan-appropriate hedges: yen longs, Nikkei put options, or reduced cross-currency exposure. The regime signal has value. The example basket does not. That distinction is the core of what RegimeR provides.
What's changing
Japan ended negative interest rates in March 2024. The BOJ policy rate is now 0.5% — the highest since 2008. JGB 10Y yields have risen above 1% for the first time in over a decade. Japan is experiencing inflation (CPI above 2%) for the first time in a generation.
As Japan's rate environment normalises, the structural conditions that broke the example basket are changing. A future validation window (2024–2027) with functioning bond yields may produce different results. We will test this when sufficient data accumulates, and publish the outcome regardless.
Could this happen in other regions?
The five pool-validated regions (US, AU, DE, GB, CA) all maintain functioning sovereign bond markets with positive nominal yields. None have experienced the sustained zero-rate environment that characterises Japan's structural limitation. Germany operated under ECB negative rates from 2019–2022, but bund yields still rallied during Eurozone stress events (flight to Germany from periphery) — a dynamic that JGBs do not benefit from. If a validated region were to adopt sustained ZIRP, the example baskets would need to be redesigned — but the regime signal would remain applicable.